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I. Introduction  
 
Just how significant is the freedom of contract found in article 16 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (the Charter) for the Union’s regulatory clout? Rarely has such an 
innocuous—indeed downright uninspiring—provision generated such controversy. Yet, for the 
first half of its existence as a legally effective fundamental right, few could have foreseen that 
article 16 would soon be at the centre of debates surrounding the precise place of business 
freedoms within EU law. All of this has changed in the wake of a number of controversial 
decisions in the employment context, in which the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) relied on 
article 16 to undermine the effectiveness of employee-protective legislative rights.1 These 
developments garnered criticism from a number of commentators, who saw a radical turning 
point in the CJEU’s treatment of contractual autonomy.2 It is argued here that these 
employment law judgments are not simply outliers, but rather they are likely to represent 
something more fundamental within the constitutional architecture of the Union, with 
implications for the EU’s ability to protect and promote social values.  
 
This article demonstrates through an analysis of the case law and reliance on the notion of 
‘fundamental contradiction’ in Critical Legal Studies (CLS) that existing arguments as to the 
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use of article 16 as a radical tool in the employment context have been both exaggerated and 
underplayed. In particular, the argument that article 16 conflicts with the CJEU’s pre-existing 
case law on freedom of contract is shown to be much more ambiguous than at first sight.3 CLS 
arguments have largely been absent from debates surrounding freedom of contract in EU law 
and employment lawyers have generally paid scant attention to the CLS idea of fundamental 
contradiction, despite its clear implications for the (ir)reconcilability of economic and social 
values. By disrupting the existing narrative as to the effects of article 16, an issue, which 
appears to be confined to employment law, is shown to raise broader questions as to the place 
of social rights considerations in EU law more generally. Determining the place of contractual 
autonomy within the employment context is also imperative to the proper understanding for 
employers, employees and policy makers of the regulatory reach of significant sources of EU 
employment legislation.   
 
Although illustrated using employment law concepts, the question of the precise influence of 
article 16 has significance for the wider framework of EU law beyond the employment context. 
Debates as to the extent of the influence of article 16 are also likely to reach into the Union’s 
new governance tools, notably the European Semester, European Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the nascent Pillar of Social Rights. Despite this, generalist EU lawyers have paid very little 
attention to the CJEU’s use of article 16 in the employment context. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that the most controversial cases to date have been confined to rather 
technical areas of EU employment law, including the transfer of undertakings and collective 
redundancies.  
 
To an extent, the conflict between economic and social aspects of integration has been a 
perennial question in EU law, but the granting of legal effect to the Charter has thrown an 
added constitutional or rights dimension into the mix. Resisting the strength of contractual 
autonomy as a Charter right is likely to require a constitutional solution. The solution posited 
here is to be found in the general principles of EU law. First, it may be possible to return to the 
approach adopted in the CJEU’s early case law on business freedom as a general principle, in 
which the concept was usually defeated. Second, it is argued that employees can match the 
employer’s freedom of contract by raising autonomy arguments of their own, in the form of 
the freedom to pursue a profession as a general principle and the right to work found in article 
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15 of the Charter. The right to work may prove to be the strongest counterweight to the 
challenges posed by article 16 to the continued potency of EU employment regulation. The 
question of the precise relationship between the Charter and the general principles is also an 
issue that will come to the fore post-Brexit. The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 makes clear that 
the Charter will no longer form part of domestic law post-Brexit, but that the general principles 
will retain their interpretative function.  
 
 
Section II sets out the nature of freedom of contract in EU law, including the Charter’s 
potentially far-reaching effects in the employment context. This section then considers the first 
possible solution to unravelling the alleged inconsistencies in the use of contractual autonomy 
as a legal concept, namely a return to business freedom as a general principle. CLS is relied on 
to demonstrate that the differing approaches of the CJEU to the general principles and the 
Charter are actually reflective of a more fundamental contradiction between individual and 
communitarian values, a contradiction that makes the emphasis on freedom of contract in 
article 16 all the more troubling. We then turn to the question of the connection between article 
16 and the core fundamental freedoms of EU law. Section III addresses the second solution of 
raising the right to work and employee autonomy as both a general principle and Charter right 
as a counterweight to freedom of contract.  
 
 
II. The Many Meanings of Freedom Contract in EU Law  
 
A. The Multiple Visions of Contractual Autonomy 
 
Before analysing the effects of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right, it is useful to 
consider what that concept actually means in a broader EU law context. A recurring theme in 
the literature is the notion that contractual autonomy has a dual purpose. Freedom of contract 
can be viewed either as an overarching economic principle underpinning all markets—the 
‘market vision’—or it can be seen as a moral principle, based on the will of individuals—the 
‘voluntarist’ vision of contractual autonomy.4 Both of these visions can be found in EU law. 
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The fundamental Treaty freedoms represent the market vision, with one of the aims of the 
Union being to extend market competition and contractual freedom within the internal market.5 
The idea is that the free movement rules require free choice, which requires contractual 
autonomy.6 This notion is contested and there is nothing inherent in the Treaty to suggest that 
the fundamental freedoms guarantee freedom of contract.7 EU legislation (notably consumer 
protection legislation) is said to represent the voluntarist vision, being concerned with the 
consent of the contracting parties (ie the quality of their consent to the terms of the contract).8 
As explored below, this duality—albeit in a modified form—is also reflected in the notion of 
freedom of contract as a fundamental right.  
 
Basedow argues that ‘the principle of contractual freedom has, since the nineteenth century, 
developed into a foundational tenet in regard to the regulation of economic activity within all 
European states’.9 However, the extent to which it is protected as a fundamental or 
constitutional right varies significantly between states. When it came to developing business 
freedom as an EU right, the CJEU had to turn to the constitutional traditions of the Members 
States for guidance. Only one Member State, Cyprus, grants a specific constitutional protection 
to the notion of freedom of contract as opposed to a wider commitment to business freedom.10 
Looking beyond constitutional protection, different Member States adopt different approaches 
to conceiving the protection of contractual autonomy. As Micklitz puts it, ‘[w]hat if this 
common assumption is no more than a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement”, which 
allows us to communicate whilst maintaining our own preconceptions?’.11  
 
Micklitz notes, for example, that English law has been heavily influenced by utilitarian 
thinking, linked with the rise of the trading state. English contract law is therefore underpinned 
by a notion of contractual autonomy, which is seen as a tool to promote free commerce. Under 
this model, freedom of contract ‘means first and foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily 
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9 Jürgen Basedow, ‘Freedom of Contract in the European Union’ (2008) 6 ERPL 901, 902.  
10 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Freedom to Conduct a Business: Exploring the Dimensions of a 
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engage in economic transactions without any risk of statutory interferences’.12 Such 
interference is only permitted to the extent that it solves concrete concerns. English law may 
therefore be described as liberal, utilitarian and pragmatic.13 By way of contrast, French law 
sees contractual autonomy not merely as a utilitarian tool to promote individual economic 
benefit. Rather, ‘the commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision’ ie French 
law looks to the reason behind the decision, linked to the concept of l’autonomie de la volonté 
(autonomy of the will) and the political concept of the volonté general (general will).14 
Interference with freedom of contract is seen as a political counter-project to the concept of 
contractual autonomy set out in the Civil Code. French law can thus be described as rational 
and political. For Micklitz, it is not possible to reduce the EU vision of contractual autonomy 
to a sum of the component Member State approaches. Rather, contractual autonomy in EU law 
is ‘bound to trans-border business and European economic integration’.15 
 
The absence of a clear underpinning for contractual autonomy at Union level has, to some 
extent, been addressed by the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCRF) for a harmonised 
EU contract law, which describes contractual autonomy as no more than a ‘starting point’.16 
Similarly, the Principes Directeurs explain that the principle of freedom of contract in EU law 
embraces the freedom to enter a contract, the freedom to select a contractual partner and the 
freedom of classification and content.17 The DCFR also explicitly recognises a number of 
permissible limits on the contractual autonomy principle, notably the non-enforcement of 
contracts when one of the parties is in a weak bargaining position or where consent is defective. 
The emphasis has clearly been on the restrictive nature of freedom of contract in EU law rather 
than its expansive or pervasive character.  
 
It has already been said that freedom of contract in EU law is not merely a by-product of the 
approaches adopted by its component Member States. The EU model of freedom of contract is 
distinct, being tied intimately to the development of the single market and the removal of 
barriers to trade. This is why Micklitz describes EU freedom of contract as functional and 
instrumental. Regulation of freedom of contract in the form of minimum (social) standards is 
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seen as the price to pay for the internal market. In EU law, the protection and limitation of 
freedom of contract go hand in hand in the pursuit of cross-border trade.18 This conception of 
freedom of contract also corresponds to market vision described above. The autonomous Union 
approach to dealing with the concept of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right can be 
seen in the development of business freedoms as general principles of EU law.  
 
 
B. Business Freedoms as General Principles  
 
The general principles of EU law are derived from unwritten rules not contained in the Treaties 
or secondary legislation.19 They function as an aid to interpretation and a ground for review of 
both EU legislation and Member State legislation falling within the scope of EU law.20 The 
protection of fundamental rights is one such general principle of EU law.21 This classification 
of fundamental rights protection as a general principle is now codified in article 6 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU).  
 
The Explanations attached to the Charter make clear that freedom to pursue an economic 
activity and freedom of contract, as general principles, are two of the components making up 
freedom to conduct a business in article 16 of the Charter. Taken together these two 
components are described here as business freedom as a general principle. For the first 
element—freedom to pursue an economic activity—the Explanations rely on Nold.22 In that 
case, the CJEU noted that property rights and commercial freedom were indeed general 
principles of EU law, but ‘[f]ar from constituting unfettered prerogatives must be viewed in 
the light of the social function of property and activities protected thereunder.’23 This case is 
noteworthy both for the clear recognition that there is a freedom of commerce and for the fact 
that the CJEU offered no guidance as to what it might consider the ‘substance’ of this freedom. 
The term ‘freedom to pursue an economic activity’, contrary to what the Explanations suggest, 
                                                          
18 Micklitz (n 11) 30.  
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20 Koen Lenaerts and José A Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Role of the General Principles of EU Law’ in Anthony Arnull 
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21 Case C-29/69 Stauder ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. 
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is not actually used in Nold at all, with the CJEU instead referring to the right ‘freely to choose 
and practice their trade or profession’.24  
 
In almost all subsequent cases, the CJEU has been reluctant to allow the freedom to pursue an 
economic activity as a general principle to defeat competing social or economic goals.25 The 
CJEU has consistently held that freedom to pursue an economic activity is not absolute, but 
must rather be considered in relation to its social function and provided that any restrictions 
are proportionate, in the public interest and do not impair the substance of the right.26  
The first explicit recognition of a freedom of contract as opposed to the more general freedom 
to pursue an economic activity can be found in Sukkerfabriken.27 In that case, the CJEU found 
that EU legal acts, which restrict contractual freedom, might only be permissible to the extent 
that the acts themselves give explicit authority for the intervention in private contractual 
relations, as ‘no rules or information are provided on the prescribed procedure, the forms or 
the competent authorities for the action contemplated, such as would be expected if a restriction 
were to be placed upon the freedom of contract’.28 In addition, the CJEU in Spain v Commission 
held that the authorising act must simply stipulate the exact forms and procedures to be 
followed by the intervening authority. The CJEU held that ‘the right of parties to amend 
contracts concluded by them is based on the principle of contractual freedom and cannot, 
therefore, be limited in the absence of [Union] rules imposing specific restrictions in that 
regard’.29  
On the face of it, it is difficult to track this vision of freedom of contract as a general principle 
onto the multiple approaches to freedom of contract identified earlier. It certainly does not 
neatly correspond to either the EU’s market or voluntarist visions of contractual autonomy, nor 
is it directly reflective of Micklitz’s functional description of freedom of contract in EU law. 
However, it bears a close resemblance to the English liberal approach to freedom of contract, 
which holds that the state can only act to the extent that it has been given legal authority.  
                                                          
24 ibid.  
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21; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:1994:367 para 78; Case C-177/90 Kühn ECLI:EU:C:1992:2 
para 16; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match ECLI:EU:C:2004:802 para 72. 
26 Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland ECLI:EU:C:2004:497.  
27 Case C-151/78 Sukkerfabriken ECLI:EU:C:1979:4.  
28 ibid para 20.  
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Taken as a whole, the case law on business freedom as a general principle, far from representing 
a comprehensive statement of that freedom, rather consists of a selective approach. It is also 
clear that freedom to pursue a commercial activity, freedom of contract and free competition 
cannot be the only elements making up a freedom to conduct a business. Such a freedom should 
also include other aspects such as the right to own property and the right to work, which has 
also been recognised as a general principle, as can be seen from the case law above and which 
is considered further below in Section III.  
 
C. Freedom of Contract as a Fundamental Right 
 
According to article 16 of the Charter: ‘The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’. Prassl has distinguished between two 
aspects of freedom of contract as a fundamental right in article 16, namely freedom of contract 
as an overarching constitutional concept and freedom of contract as a substantive individual 
right.30 This is largely reflective of the dichotomy generally attributed to freedom of contract 
in EU law, as set out above. Therefore, when the Charter was granted legal effect, it was 
expected that the CJEU’s approach to business freedom and freedom of contract would 
continue largely uninterrupted, particularly given the close connection made in the 
Explanations between the Charter and the general principles. Most of the earlier case law on 
article 16 did indeed follow the pattern of the general principle of freedom to pursue an 
economic activity, with arguments based on that freedom largely being unsuccessful.31 Many 
of these cases repeat the standard formula that business freedom may be restricted in the public 
interest provided that any restriction is proportionate. Some cases refer to the social function 
of business freedom.32 Others omit such a reference, but nevertheless restrict the freedom 
through the proportionality principle.33 In other cases, arguments based on the infringement of 
article 16 are merely an afterthought, with the General Court expressing its frustration at ‘the 
                                                          
30 Jeremias Prassl, ‘Business Freedoms’ (n 2) 193.  
31 Case C-210/00 Käserei ECLI:EU:C:2002:440; Case C-544/10 Deutches Weintor ECLI:EU:C:2012:526; Case 
C-441/07 Alrosa ECLI:EU:C:2010:377.  
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mere abstract reference to such an infringement’.34 With the exception of Scarlet Extended, 
arguments based on the freedom to conduct a business were defeated in all cases.35  
This restrictive approach to the freedom to conduct a business in article 16 would seemingly 
change following a number of controversial judgments delivered in the employment context. 
The first of these cases, Alemo-Herron is said to mark the turning point in the CJEU’s approach 
to contractual autonomy. It is therefore worth dealing with that case in some detail, before 
considering the CJEU’s subsequent reliance on article 16.  
i. The decision in Alemo-Herron  
 
The question which arose in Alemo-Herron was whether, upon the transfer of a business from 
one employer to another, the new employer should be bound only by collectively agreed terms 
in force at the time of the transfer, known as the ‘static’ approach, or whether they should also 
be bound by future changes to those collective agreements, known as the ‘dynamic’ approach. 
The latter approach was adopted by English courts following the enactment of the original 
version of the Transfer of Undertakings and Protection of Employment Regulations 2006 
(TUPE), which implement the EU’s Transfer of Undertakings Directive (TUD). The Directive 
is a minimum harmonisation measure, meaning that Member States are free to increase the 
level of protection granted to employees. The dynamic approach is more protective of 
employees as it ensures that they continue to be covered by the same collective agreements, 
including future changes to those agreements. 
In Alemo-Herron, the company sought to rely on the earlier CJEU decision in Werhof to 
challenge the continuation of a collective agreement, as they had not been involved in the 
negotiation of that agreement.36 In that earlier case, the CJEU found that the dynamic approach 
was not necessitated by the TUD, but neither was it prohibited. As a starting point, AG Cruz 
Villalón noted that the effect of Werhof was clearly to rule out the possibility that the TUD 
required Member States to permit the transfer of dynamic clauses referring to future collective 
agreements.37 He then noted that Parkwood, unlike Freeway (the company in Werhof), had 
taken over an undertaking that was originally in the public sector. Consequently, Parkwood 
could neither take part in nor indirectly influence the collective bargaining process that takes 
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place within the National Joint Council (NJC), which is exclusively a body for local 
government collective bargaining.38  
The AG concluded that ‘in the context of the transfer of an undertaking, there is no obstacle to 
Member States allowing a transfer of dynamic clauses referring to future collective 
agreements’.39 The AG then highlighted the employer’s freedom of contract found in article 
16.40 Despite this, he went on to uphold the dynamic approach so long as it was not 
unconditional or irreversible.41  
By contrast, the CJEU preferred to adopt the static approach, holding that where a transferee 
does not have the opportunity to participate in negotiations that are concluded after the date of 
transfer, the outcome of the negotiations should not be binding.42 The CJEU noted that a 
balance had to be struck, with ‘due weight’ being given to the freedom of contract of employers:  
[i]t is apparent that, by reason of the freedom to conduct a business, the transferee must 
be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and 
to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees 
with a view to its future economic activity.43 
The dynamic approach to collectively agreed terms was therefore not valid. To hold otherwise, 
the Court reasoned, would be to reduce employer freedom ‘to the point that such a limitation 
is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’.44  
It could have been argued that the transferee employer had consented to the transfer and had 
done so under the existing terms and conditions, which should have included the dynamic 
clause. For the CJEU, however, this consent was defective because the new employer was not 
capable of taking part in the negotiating process. Here, the ‘voluntarist’ and ‘market’ visions of 
freedom of contract in EU law coincide, with the CJEU also (albeit tacitly) expressing concern 
that allowing the dynamic approach would be to impede or discourage the acquisition of 
undertakings, particularly in the context of privatisation.  
The CJEU’s approach to contractual autonomy in Alemo-Herron goes beyond the English 
liberal conception of that freedom. Here, there was quite clearly authority provided in law for 
                                                          
38 ibid.  
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42 ibid para 37.  
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the restriction on the employer’s freedom of contract. The restriction also provided a solution 
to a concrete problem—one of the permissible restrictions on freedom of contract according to 
the liberal theory. Alemo-Herron much more closely aligns to the idea that freedom of contract 
in EU law is functional ie it is about the construction and maintenance of an internal market. 
As will be explained below, CLS might help to explain the strong notion of freedom of contract 
suddenly espoused in Alemo-Herron.  
The judgment is clearly not consistent with the CJEU’s earlier decision in Werhof.45 Moreover, 
it ignores the fact that article 8 TUD expressly permits Member States to increase the level of 
protection granted to employees.46 The CJEU also granted unnecessary weight to freedom of 
contract within article 16, which after all provides that the ‘freedom’ (not the right) to conduct 
a business is ‘recognised’ (not guaranteed). Perhaps the most significant criticism of the 
judgment is that the CJEU’s use of article 16 in Alemo-Herron marks a radical departure from 
the pre-existing case law on business freedom as a general principle.47 The reality of the 
relationship between article 16 and the general principles is much more nuanced.  
ii. Compatibility of business freedom as a fundamental right with the general 
principles 
From the case law on freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle, it is 
possible to discern a number of criteria which must be considered when assessing the 
compatibility of legislation with that general principle. First, the freedom is not absolute, but 
must be considered in relation to its social function. Second, any restrictions must be 
proportionate. Third, restrictions must be in the public interest. Finally, any restrictions must 
not impair the very substance of the freedom. Each of these elements will now be addressed in 
turn.  
a. The social function of commercial freedom  
Despite the CJEU’s glossing over of the term in its judgments, the concept of the social function 
of commercial freedom hides a far from universally accepted notion of the limits to be placed 
on property rights. Foster and Bonilla remark that ‘the classical liberal conception of property 
dominates the modern legal and political imagination. The idea that property is a subjective 
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and nearly absolute right controls the way in which most of the modern law and politics 
understands this institution’.48 There is a vast literature on this liberal conception of property, 
with the most ubiquitous understanding of the concept deriving from Locke and Hegel whose 
writings are frequently used to ‘justify the private property relations that underpin modern 
Western society’.49 Stone comments that the works of Locke and Hegel, ‘signal the two related 
but distinct bases of conventional property theory; first, that property is a legitimate reward for 
the enterprise of the sovereign individual; second, that it is through property that we understand 
the boundaries of the self’.50 Kant goes further in explicitly tying his conception of property to 
the liberal notion of ‘freedom’, defined as the absence of constraint.51  
A common theme connecting critiques of this orthodox position includes the idea that property 
should be understood in its social and political context.52 For example, Duguit has argued that 
property is not a right but rather a social function. According to this view, ‘property has internal 
limits—not just external ones as in the case of the liberal right to property’.53 It is unclear 
whether this is the theory the CJEU had in mind when it proclaimed that property and business 
rights must be considered in relation to their ‘social function’. Indeed, Kant, who explicitly 
draws a link between property and liberty, also views property as having a form of social 
function. For Kant, property and freedom are not merely coextensive. Rather, freedom is the 
basis for property. As Stone remarks, ‘property is not a pure metaphysical bond between an 
individual and an object; it concerns a social connection with others’. 54  In other words, it has 
a social or relational function.  
It is doubtful that the CJEU intended to revisit the liberal foundations of property in its 
judgments on the general principles. It is equally unclear what the CJEU meant when it said 
that property has a social function. The absence of explicit reasoning in the article 16 
jurisprudence is equally regrettable. In those cases, not only did the CJEU fail to consider the 
competing social goals which might limit business freedom as a fundamental right, but it also 
manifestly ignored the potential internal limitations on this freedom, in the form of its social 
                                                          
48 Sheila R Foster and Daniel Bonilla, ‘Symposium on the Social Function of Property: A Comparative Law 
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50 ibid 384. 
51 ibid.   
52 ibid 385.  
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function; a conception (however ambiguous) of property rights it apparently subscribed to not 
long ago. 
This confusion in relation to the freedom to pursue an economic activity is thrown into even 
sharper focus when we consider that the case law on freedom of contract as a general principle 
makes no mention whatsoever of that right being restricted by any social function. Indeed, in 
those cases, the CJEU gave no indication as to the permissible limits on contractual autonomy. 
In Spain, the CJEU merely held that ‘the right of parties to amend contracts concluded by them 
is based on the principle of contractual freedom and cannot, therefore, be limited in the absence 
of [Union] rules imposing specific restrictions in that regard’.55  
The CJEU went on to note that ‘provided that the purpose of the contractual amendment is not 
contrary to the objective pursued by the applicable [Union] rules and does not involve any risk 
of fraud, such an amendment cannot be regarded as unlawful’.56 In this case, the CJEU tacitly 
accepted the possibility of limiting the principle of contractual autonomy in EU law, but 
provided only fraudulent activity and the Union’s objectives as specific examples of such 
limitations. In Sukkerfabriken, the CJEU was equally reticent. In that case, the CJEU held that 
the legislation in question provided no rules ‘on the prescribed procedure, the forms of the 
competent authorities for the action contemplated, such as would be expected if a restriction 
were to be placed upon freedom of contract’.57 
Clearly, the cases dealing specifically with freedom of contract do not refer to the concept of a 
social function, nor is there any reference in those cases to the jurisprudence on freedom to 
pursue an economic activity as a general principle from which an implicit restriction on 
freedom of contract based on its social function could be inferred. The same is true of Alemo-
Herron, which makes no reference at all to a social function. Zuckerfabrik, a case that 
represents the modern statement of business freedom as a general principle, also makes no 
mention of that freedom having any social function.58 Tellingly, this is one of the cases relied 
on by the AG in Alemo-Herron. 
b. Restrictions must be proportionate  
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In its jurisprudence on the freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle, the 
CJEU took as its starting point that restrictions on that right were prima facie lawful.59 In 
Alemo-Herron, the CJEU reversed this starting point, requiring justification for restricting 
business freedom from the outset.60  
What we learn from the case law on the freedom to pursue an economic activity is that the 
CJEU tends to grant a wide margin of discretion to the Union legislature, particularly in fields 
involving complex and sensitive social, political and economic choices.61 No such discretion 
is granted to the Member States in Alemo-Herron. In fact, in that case, the CJEU showed 
insensitivity towards the domestic labour traditions of the United Kingdom despite the fact that 
the TUD was a minimum harmonisation measure.  
Another point of note is that in its earlier case law, the CJEU showed little concern for the 
actual impact of a measure on the traders’ business freedoms.62 In Alemo-Herron, the CJEU 
showed greater concern for the effect of the interpretation of the TUD on individual traders, 
holding that ‘a dynamic clause referring to collective agreements negotiated and agreed after 
the date of transfer of the undertaking concerned that are intended to regulate changes in 
working conditions in the public sector is liable to limit considerably the room for manoeuvre 
necessary for a private transferee to make such adjustments and changes’.63 The CJEU fails to 
set out precisely what this impact would be. Once again, if we look to the case law on freedom 
of contract as a general principle, there is no engagement with the proportionality issue at all.  
c. Restrictions must be in the public interest 
In its case law on freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle, the CJEU took 
a wide approach to this issue, with relatively mundane restrictions of commercial autonomy 
being held to be in the public interest.64 In Alemo-Herron, there was no mention of a wider 
public interest. Admittedly, given the context, there was a discussion of the interests of 
employees and therefore implicitly the interests of society in regulating the employment 
relationship.65 
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Again, however, if we look to the case law on freedom of contract as a general principle, there 
is no explicit mention of the public or general interest. Spain refers to the Union’s financial 
interest,66 whereas Sukkerfabriken speaks of the objectives of the common organisation of the 
market.67 
 
d. Restrictions must not impair the substance of the freedom  
In the case law on freedom to pursue an economic activity, the CJEU consistently found that 
the essence or core of that principle has been left untouched.68 Restrictions were usually 
justified despite their financial impact. The CJEU viewed such interference as restricting the 
modalities of the exercise of economic freedom as opposed to interference with the right itself. 
In Alemo-Herron, however, the CJEU held that what appeared on its face merely to be an issue 
of how the right was exercised turned out to affect the very core or essence of that right.69 The 
case law on freedom of contract as a general principle also does not refer to a core or essence 
of the right at all.  
What we can take from this analysis of the case law on freedom of contract and the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity as both a fundamental right and a general principle is that it is 
really rather difficult to say whether the CJEU’s recent use of article 16 marks a significant 
departure from this earlier jurisprudence. In certain respects, Alemo-Herron does indeed depart 
from earlier case law on the general principles, especially that on freedom to pursue an 
economic activity. In other respects, however, it actually reflects the inconsistencies in that 
case law, including the fact that different language is used when describing limitations to 
freedom of contract and freedom to pursue an economic activity. 
It might therefore be argued, that the apparent divergence between the general principles and 
the Charter is not a contradiction, but rather a ‘fundamental contradiction’ understood in CLS 
terms. Relying on CLS allows us to demonstrate that the CJEU’s use of article 16 in cases such 
as Alemo-Herron is simultaneously uncontroversial and yet hides a deeper contradiction within 
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the concept of contractual autonomy, with potentially more serious implications for the future 
regulation of the employment relationship.  
iii. The meaning of ‘fundamental contradiction’ in Critical Legal Studies  
The CLS movement seeks to uncover contradictions in the law and to expose its erratic and 
irrational application, with the aim of bringing about radical or revolutionary social change.70  
Inconsistencies are said by CLS theorists to undermine coherence and thereby the law’s 
legitimacy. A key aim, then, of analysing inconsistencies in the law is to highlight that the 
contradictions of liberal legalism and the ideology it generates, consist of rival social visions.  
In other words, CLS rejects the idea that the law is coherent and predictable, arguing instead 
that legal decisions are dependent on the outcome of a series of contradictory principles, which 
reflect irreconcilable fundamental contradictions within the law. These contradictions expose 
the reality that the law is not a coherent set of principles that can be systematically tied together. 
The main value of relying on CLS in this article is to tease out the meaning of ‘contradiction’ 
in the law and also to demonstrate that the liberal concept of freedom of contract has been used 
to embed the status quo, which any social restrictions in the name of rebalancing were always 
likely to struggle to overcome. 
There are many views on the meaning of contradiction within CLS. The most ubiquitous 
conception comes from Kennedy, who argues that all contradictions in the law flow from one 
fundamental contradiction, which is the idea that ‘relations with others are both necessary and 
incompatible with our freedom’.71 In other words, although liberalism espouses individual 
freedom, we rely on the law and the institutions of the state to ensure that individual freedom 
is not abused. In turn, as well as protecting our freedom, these state institutions may threaten 
that same freedom. Thus, Kennedy sets up an irresoluble fundamental contradiction between 
freedom (the individual) and the community. Kennedy argues that the contradiction between 
individualism/self/autonomy and community/others/collective security is at the heart of all 
legal problems.72 The idea is that while, in theory, it is possible to interfere with individual 
autonomy just enough so that it protects overall freedom, in practice the decision as to the 
correct balance between the freedom of the individual and overall freedom will vary from place 
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to place, era to era and judge to judge. For this reason, it will always be possible to point to 
conflicts or contradictions between individual judgments. The fundamental contradiction tells 
us that consistency is never really possible.  
Fundamental contradictions have also been identified within freedom of contract itself. Mensch 
argues that freedom of contract seeks to protect our freedom to enter mutually beneficial 
arrangements, while simultaneously holding us to those arrangements even when they cease to 
be beneficial. The contradiction here is that freedom of contract leads to coercion.73 Unger, in 
his critical analysis of contract law doctrine also identifies freedom of contract as one of its 
underlying principles. Unger’s understanding of this principle is that ‘the parties must be free 
to choose the terms of their agreement. Save in special cases, they will not be second-guessed 
by a court, not least as long as they stay within the ground rules that defined a regime of free 
contract’.74 This principle can be met with a counter principle (which Unger suggests has been 
marginalised to date), namely the idea that unfair bargains should not be enforced.75 We will 
come back to this notion of counter principle in the discussion of the right to work below.  
It is clearly possible to track the idea of fundamental contradiction onto contractual autonomy 
in EU law.  The concept of freedom of contract reflects the individualism/freedom limb of the 
fundamental contradiction.76 This limb is illustrated in general EU law via the DCFR which, 
as discussed, views freedom of contract as embracing the right to enter a contract, to select the 
other party and to classify the contract. Essentially, we should be free to make our own 
decisions without any interference on altruistic, protectionist or paternalistic grounds. The 
second limb of the contradiction is that the law does indeed interfere with freedom of contract 
in order to protect the weaker party. Again, the DCFR sets out a number of permissible 
restrictions on contractual autonomy in EU law, most notably the non-enforcement of contracts 
when one of the parties is in a weak bargaining position or where consent is defective. The 
same contradiction is reflected in the concept of freedom of contract as a fundamental right in 
EU law. On the one hand, we have the recognition that contractual autonomy and the freedom 
to pursue an economic activity are rights to be protected. On the other hand, we have limitations 
placed on those rights, for example through the recognition of a competing social function. 
More broadly, we have already seen that that the concept of freedom of contract within article 
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16 itself has multiple and potentially contradictory aims. It can be viewed as an individual right, 
promoting autonomy (voluntarist perspective) or it can be characterised as a tool in the 
construction of an economic constitution for Europe (market perspective). The latter requires 
the promotion of business freedom while the former requires its limitation through legislation.  
What CLS (or at least Unger—whose membership of CLS is admittedly controversial) teaches 
us is that, rather than overthrowing the underlying theory (for example, freedom of contract), 
it is possible to modify existing doctrines to accentuate and develop an alternative image of 
social life, until such time as the counter principle becomes dominant.77 As such, rather than 
being incoherent or contradictory, a legal doctrine might be described as adaptable, allowing 
judges a necessary flexibility in deciding between competing demands.78 Such a process may 
‘leave a messy line of precedents behind that can be seized upon by lurking critical theorists 
and pronounced incoherent’.79 Viewed in this way, the apparent conflict between freedom of 
contract as a fundamental right and freedom of contract as a general principle may represent a 
reflection of the ebb and flow of the emphasis placed on business freedom within EU law more 
generally as discussed at (v) below. This also reflects the more general ebb and flow of the 
relationship between individualism (freedom of contract and capitalism) and altruism.80  
Feynman and Gabel point out that despite the increased emphasis on the altruistic/collective 
limb of the fundamental contradiction throughout the 20th century, the old freedom of contract 
principles deriving from the 19th century still survive, thereby contributing to the law’s 
incoherence.81 The new approach does not eradicate the old and the fundamental contradiction 
survives. In this way, contradictions in the law are reflective of the values that are emphasised 
at a particular point in time. This reflects the argument made by Unger that one side of the 
contradiction (or duality as he puts it) tends to be favoured over the other.82 CLS argues that 
when individualism is pitted against communitarianism, it is usually the former that prevails. 
This is the liberal capitalist status quo identified by CLS as the main target for challenge.  
Liberal theory itself also recognises the potential for contradiction and incoherence in the law. 
The main difference between liberal theory and CLS is that the former will seek to create 
                                                          
77 Hunt (n 70).  
78 ibid 33, 36.  
79 ibid 36.  
80 Feinman and Gabel, ‘Contract Law as Ideology’ in David Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law (New York: 1982, Basic 
Books) ch 8.  
81 ibid. 
82 Unger (n 72).   
19 
 
coherence by identifying and then attempting to rationalise or remove contradictions, whereas 
the latter views the contradictions as being inherent in the legal system and therefore 
irresolvable. Of course, we are entitled to expect a minimum standard of rationality from the 
judiciary. This does not mean that courts cannot change their understanding of a particular legal 
concept, as long as it advances valid arguments to support its decision. CLS goes further, 
arguing that the idea of consistency or coherence is mythological, being no more than a 
rhetorical device, creating a veneer of legitimacy for judicial decision-making. It is therefore 
unwise to expect consistency if the basic ideas underlying the law are in conflict. This is all the 
more so when we consider the peculiarities of the CJEU’s reasoning process and the absence 
of a doctrine of precedent.83 For CLS scholars, this must be particularly true of rights, which 
are ‘defined on too abstract a level to be helpful in resolving the claims presented in 
particular’.84  
One does not necessarily have to accept the entirety of CLS’s critique of liberal legalism to 
recognise its potential value in highlighting the wider fundamental contradictions within 
freedom of contract that can help to explain these inconsistencies between the general 
principles and article 16. Of course, it is also possible to view what appear to be contradictions 
in the law as no more than ‘competing’ principles. This was certainly the view of Dworkin in 
his criticism of CLS when he said that ‘[t]wo abstract principles (…) could live together 
comfortably (…) even though they sometimes conflict’.85 From a doctrinal perspective, the 
above discussion sought to show that rather than necessarily being contradictory, the 
approaches adopted by the CJEU in the general principles and article 16 cases may simply be 
viewed as competing visions of freedom of contract as developed over time and in different 
contexts.  The idea that the general principles and the Charter might represent competing rather 
than necessarily contradictory concepts of freedom of contract also raises the question of 
whether the Charter and the general principles will actually continue to represent two distinct 
sources of EU fundamental rights. 
iv. The relationship between the general principles and the Charter  
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The intimate link between the general principles and the Charter is made clear by the 
Explanations, which confirm that many of the Charter’s provisions derive from pre-existing 
general principles. More broadly, article 6 TEU also confirms that far from being a mere source 
of Charter rights, the general principles and the Charter actually enjoy the same constitutional 
status. However, we are given no indication as to the precise relationship between these 
sources. If the Charter was merely intended to codify or render more visible existing EU 
fundamental rights, this begs the question of whether the Charter replaces the general principles 
or whether the two sources are now co-terminous and mutually dependent.  
Using the Charter as the CJEU’s primary point of reference may be to overlook the fact that 
the general principles themselves have been explicitly recognised as having constitutional 
status by their inclusion in the Treaties. Nevertheless, cases dealing with article 16 confirm that 
the Charter is to be the principal source of EU fundamental rights. We saw that in Alemo-
Herron, the CJEU did not refer to its existing jurisprudence on contractual autonomy as a 
general principle. Given the lack of explicit prioritisation of the Charter, it is perhaps the case 
that the CJEU merely uses the Charter as a starting point from a purely practical perspective. 
In any case, the Charter’s provisions, which are often indeterminate in themselves, will 
continue to be informed by the general principles.86  Furthermore, the general principles will 
continue to have a role outside the Charter, serving to fill gaps in the law and promoting 
consistent interpretation.87 Finally, the CJEU confirmed in Åkerberg Franson that the general 
principles and the Charter enjoy the same scope of application.88 The interdependence between 
the general principles and the Charter is further borne out by the fact that the Charter itself may 
become a source of general principles.89  
It is all very well in the abstract stating that the Charter and the general principles will continue 
to co-exist as sources of fundamental rights, but if a Charter right derives from a pre-existing 
general principle, it has been argued by some commentators that this has the effect of 
extinguishing, or at least deprioritising, the general principle. For example, Oliver suggests that 
‘Article 16 seamlessly replaced the pre-existing fundamental right to conduct a business which 
had existed as a general principle of Union law’.90 As already argued, this is not true, as article 
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16 is made up of diverse components, which have been treated differently by the CJEU in its 
earlier case law.  
The CJEU continues to adopt a pick and choose approach, sometimes referring to earlier case 
law on the general principles and sometimes ignoring it entirely. Oliver goes on to argue that, 
even if the general principles and article 16 were different concepts, there would be ‘no point 
in maintaining in existence two overlapping but slightly different fundamental rights’.91 This 
overlooks the fact that the Explanations make clear that the general principles can be used as a 
guide to the interpretation of article 16. If the content of the general principles and article 16 
were homogenous, there would be little point on ever relying on the former.  
In addition, the Charter was merely intended to codify existing rights, ie it is a snapshot in time. 
This cannot preclude the further development and evolution of the general principles, including 
in a field covered by the Charter. Otherwise, this would create two classes of general principle; 
one independent of the Charter and the other subsumed by it. No such division is envisaged by 
the Treaty. The CJEU has also more recently drawn a very clear distinction between the general 
principles and article 16 by tying the latter provision into the four fundamental freedoms of EU 
law.  
v. Fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms  
One of the most controversial judgments handed down in the wake of Alemo-Herron suggests 
that freedom of contract within article 16 is linked intimately with the freedom of establishment 
found in article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In AGET 
Iraklis, the CJEU had to assess the compatibility of Greek legislation requiring prior 
authorisation of collective redundancies with both article 16 of the Charter and article 49 
TFEU. The CJEU noted that the decision to engage in collective redundancies was a 
fundamental decision in the life of an undertaking and that, as a result, the legislation at issue 
was likely to hinder or make less attractive that freedom. Consequently, the measure also 
hindered or limited the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business in article 16.92 This 
approach reflects the language of Alemo-Herron, where the CJEU found that the dynamic 
approach excessively interfered with the employer’s room for manoeuvre to make adjustments. 
In both cases, the CJEU was not susceptible to the argument that the employers entered the 
market or accepted the transfer knowing about the pre-existing restrictions on their contractual 
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autonomy (the dynamic clause in Alemo-Herron and requirement of approval for collective 
redundancies in AGET Iraklis).  
At a first glance, the connection drawn between the freedom of establishment and article 16 
should be very worrying from the perspective of those who support a stronger level of 
protection for workers’ rights in the face of competing business freedoms. In Alemo-Herron, 
the CJEU took as its starting point, the employer’s freedom of contract, with the dynamic 
approach acting as a restriction on that freedom. This is a standard application of the freedom 
of establishment approach, which is also reflected in AGET Iraklis. The consequence of this 
approach is that social concerns are viewed as restrictions of the underlying Treaty 
freedom/freedom of contract. Any derogation from the fundamental freedoms must be 
interpreted restrictively. This puts social considerations on the back foot from the very outset.  
Having said that, the CJEU has often been open to arguments based on the protection of 
workers, even developing a specific worker protection derogation from the Treaty freedoms.93 
As Barnard notes, where there is a genuine concern for the protection of workers at national 
level, the Court will uphold the worker protection justification.94 The CJEU has long 
recognised worker protection as a legitimate derogation allowing Member States to justify 
national laws providing substantive protection to the weaker party so long as the derogation 
respected the limits of EU law and did not render the economic freedom illusory.95  
In cases such as Schmidberger,96 the CJEU has demonstrated that where the case is more 
removed from commercial considerations (in that case, the right to protest), ‘the more generous 
the Court is as regards the available scope for justification and also the breadth of the margin 
of appreciation’.97 In other cases such as Viking, the CJEU clearly got the balance wrong, with 
free movement provisions being used to defeat the right to strike. This was despite the CJEU’s 
recognition that such a right was also a general principle of EU law.98 This is likely to be part 
of broader phenomenon whereby any social dimension to the freedom of movement will of 
necessity be subject (if not subordinate) to the economic rationale inherent within the Treaty 
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provisions. Any such economic rationale does not lead to the conclusion that free movement 
law somehow embodies a principle of contractual autonomy.99 Again, drawing on CLS allows 
us to view this conflict as part of the wider irreconcilable fundamental contradiction between 
freedom of contract and the need for state intervention and demonstrates that consistency is not 
achievable.  
The real problem lies in the fact that freedom of contract is now being prioritised by the CJEU, 
while employment rights that potentially restrict that freedom are largely being overlooked. As 
Unger would put it, the principle is being privileged at the expense of the counter principle. A 
more substantive view of autonomy envisages legislative intervention as a means of preserving 
the autonomy of the weaker party (for example, the worker).100 To achieve this, it will be 
necessary to end the conception of legislative intervention as an exception or inherent limitation 
on contractual autonomy, which is seen as the normal and justified state of affairs. As explained 
below, some legislative rights are underpinned by fundamental Charter rights with at least 
nominally equal weight to article 16. Yet, the CJEU continues to view freedom of contract as 
the ‘right’ to be protected, with any regulation of that right requiring justification. This reflects 
an ongoing problem whereby regulation is seen as a cost on business, which as such interferes 
with contractual autonomy. Clearly, difficulties in determining the precise content of freedom 
of contract long pre-date article 16, with the CJEU’s recent case law merely continuing a 
tradition of inconsistency and lack of clarity as to the limits of freedom of contract. 
Evidently, employment law is not the only context in which the reach of article 16 might 
extend.101 This is largely due to the position of the Charter at the pinnacle of the Union’s 
hierarchy of norms. This also ties in with the earlier discussion on CLS, which views the 
fundamental contradiction between the individual and the community as being tilted in favour 
of the former. Given the privileged constitutional position of freedom of contract, the answer 
to clarifying its precise regulatory reach requires a much more robust application of the 
constitutionalised social rights found in the Charter. One such provision is the right to work, 
which enjoys an equally long pedigree as a general principle. It is also argued here that the 
right to work has the potential to act a counter principle to freedom of contract in the vein of 
suggestions made by Unger mentioned above in the discussion of CLS.  
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III. Countering Contractual Autonomy with the Right to Work  
 
A. The Nature of the Right to Work and its Relationship with Freedom of Contract  
In its case law on the freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle, the CJEU 
drew a connection between business freedom and the freedom to pursue an occupation, with 
the CJEU recognising that the concepts are related and that both are general principles of EU 
law.102 But, in previous case law, the CJEU has shown a preference for counterbalancing 
Charter rights with other provisions found in the Charter, rather than with general principles.103 
A similar concept to the freedom to pursue an occupation is found within the Charter in the 
form of the right to work in article 15, which is itself partly derived from the earlier case law 
on freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle. 
Article 15(1) provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely 
chosen or accepted occupation’. The language used here is much more robust and rights-
oriented than that found in either article 16 or indeed many of the Charter’s employment rights. 
It is for this reason and also for its inclusion in the Freedom Title (the same Title as article 16), 
that the right to work might be thought to be particularly apt to counterbalance business 
freedom as a fundamental right. Despite this, the right has so far been over-looked by both 
litigants and the judiciary. There are a number of reasons for the right to work’s absence to 
date.  
First, there is no consensus on the nature and content of the right to work. The right to work 
could be aimed at achieving full employment and could be seen as guaranteeing the right of 
every individual to a job. It can also be conceived as a right not only to work, but also to decent 
work. Finally, the right could be about something broader still, being ‘more than freedom from 
coercion or freedom of occupation [entailing] a more positive dimension—the right to have 
work (…) and rights in work or at work’.104 If we look to the Explanations attached to article 
15 of the Charter, there is a clear recognition that the right to work in the Charter derives from 
the case law on the freedom to pursue an economic activity as a general principle, such as 
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Nold.105 The Explanations also make clear that the right is quite firmly rooted in the freedom 
to choose an economic activity found in article 1(2) of the European Social Charter (ESC).  
We have seen that both the freedom to conduct a business and the right to work/freedom to 
choose an occupation have been intertwined since the earliest fundamental rights case law of 
the CJEU, with the right to choose and practice freely a profession being guaranteed in the 
context of business freedom.106 In those cases, it was recognised that the concepts of freedom 
to pursue an occupation and freedom to conduct a business are related but distinct. In those 
early cases, the two rights were also subject to the same limitations. Some authors have gone 
further, noting that the right to pursue an occupation and the right to run a business are actually 
the same. As Ashiagbor put it, the right to work has been said to be ‘synonymous with 
unfettered freedom of contract’.107 Others have conceived of the right to work as the freedom 
for individual employees to continue in work despite strike action; in other words, it is a tool 
for the individual to resist the action of ‘powerful’ unions.108  
Not only is the nature of the right to work vague and imprecise, but that its relationship to 
article 16 is also far from clear. There are two ways of looking at this relationship. Either article 
15 is in some way synonymous with article 16 in that it provides workers with a right to 
autonomy and the freedom to choose an occupation, or it can instead be viewed as opposing 
the employer’s freedom to conduct a business.  
If we turn to the case law of the CJEU subsequent to the Charter’s enactment, we can see that, 
to date, it is the former interpretation that has prevailed. In other words, article 15 and article 
16 are treated as synonymous. AG Bobek has been particularly extensive in his analysis of the 
relationship between the provisions. For example, in Fries, the applicant pilot was dismissed 
when he reached the age of 65 as required by EU law.109 This was despite the fact that his 
existing contract would not expire for a further two months as the statutory pension age was 
reached at 65 years and two months. For the AG, article 15 ‘enhances personal autonomy and 
self-realisation, with human dignity serving as its foundation’.110 Due to the restrictive scope 
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of the age limitation, it could not be said to affect adversely the very essence of the right to 
pursue a freely chosen occupation.111  
In Lidl, the applicant alleged that poultry labelling requirements infringed both article 15 and 
article 16. 112  For AG Bobek, both rights are connected, as is made clear by the CJEU’s case 
law on the general principles. Nevertheless, ‘the fact that the Charter today contains two 
separate provisions suggests that there ought to be some differentiation’.113 The AG started by 
looking at the wording of the two provisions and highlighted that article 16, unlike article 15 
is subject to Union law, national laws and practices. This meant that ‘Article 16 allows for a 
broader margin of appreciation when it comes to regulation that might interfere with the 
freedom to conduct a business’.114 From the case law on the general principle, it was also clear 
that the freedom to conduct a business might be subject to a broad range of interventions on 
the part of public authorities, which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public 
interest.115 This led the AG to conclude that there is no doubt that in terms of permissible 
limitations, ‘Article 16 (…) allows for a greater degree of State intervention than Article 15’.116 
This statement overlooks the fact that, as we saw, the freedom to choose an occupation was 
equally restricted in the case law of the CJEU on the general principle.117  
Turning to the precise nature of the relationship between the two rights, the AG found that both 
protect individual autonomy in the closely related professional and business fields and that both 
are linked to the performance of economic activity.118 The differences are that article 15 is 
focused on the element of choice and personal autonomy, with the link to work, emphasising 
a more relevant impact on natural persons and employment relationships. Article 16 on the 
other hand focuses on values associated with entrepreneurial activity, such as the freedom of 
contract.119  
 
B. Raising the Right to Work as a Counterweight to Freedom of Contract  
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The first major hurdle to relying on article 15 is that the CJEU has treated that provision and 
article 16 as essentially the same. We have also seen that the right to work is potentially 
composed of a number of different elements. If we start with the right to work as a right to 
continued employment, it could be argued that the very purpose of the TUD is to ensure that 
the entire workforce is transferred from the old employer to the new, with minimal exceptions, 
including the possibility of dismissals for economic, technical or organisational reasons 
(ETOR). But this is achieved via the Directive itself, with no reference to the right to work.120  
The rights granted by the TUD/TUPE do appear extensive on their face. Unless one of the 
exceptions applies, the transferee is liable to the employees ‘for everything the transferor has 
done’ ‘under or in relation to the relevant contract’, for example failure to pay wages or even 
discriminatory conduct.121 It is not difficult to tie these elements into the right to work in the 
sense that, were the employees treated less favourably upon the transfer, they would be less 
likely to consent to it. In any event, the protective status granted by the TUD is limited in time. 
Following the article 16 cases, it is clear that collectively agreed terms only transfer if they 
were in force at the time of the transfer. The TUD itself at article 3(3) foresees the possibility 
of restricting the applicability of collectively agreed terms to one-year post transfer. It may be 
significant to classify transfer rights as fundamental human rights in the guise of article 15.  
I would suggest that the temporal limitations on TUPE rights might give way if subjected to 
review in light of the Charter. If we look to the approach adopted by the CJEU in the earlier 
equality law case of Test-Achats, we can see that limitation clauses contained in the legislation 
were no match for the equality principle expressed as a fundamental right in the Charter.122 In 
cases such as Alemo-Herron, it might have been argued that the term ‘on the date of the 
transfer’ should have been more purposively construed to read ‘in connection with the transfer’. 
Alternatively, as happened in Test-Achats, the term could have been overridden entirely given 
its incompatibility with the Charter. The same is true of the possible restriction of collectively 
agreed terms to one-year post-transfer.  
Another potential way to rely on article 15 is to tie it to the notion of fair work or ‘decent work’, 
perhaps in conjunction with article 31(2) of the Charter, which guarantees fair and just 
conditions at work. It could have been argued in Alemo-Herron that being paid less than their 
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public sector counterparts (despite having previously been treated in the same way) amounted 
to degrading treatment. Article 31(2) is probably the Charter provision that has been most 
successfully invoked to reinforce the protection of employment rights. It has already been used 
to bolster the CJEU’s employee friendly purposive approach to the interpretation of 
legislation.123 It has also been used to ensure that Member States do not renege on their EU 
employment law commitments.124 Article 31(2) is drafted in much more precise and forceful 
language than many of Charter’s other provisions and has already been found capable of 
horizontal direct effect, ie it can be relied on directly in private employment disputes.125 The 
concept of fair and just conditions of work also has a long pedigree as an international right.126 
Like all Charter rights, the provision is also explicitly linked to the concept of human dignity, 
as made clear by the Explanations. This connection adds significant normative weight to the 
idea of fair and just working conditions as a counterpoise to business freedoms.   
Perhaps the most promising avenue for counteracting article 16 is, in fact, the aspect of article 
15 that has been most prevalent in the case law on the general principle, namely the freedom 
to choose or pursue an occupation. It was seen in the analysis of the article 15 case law above 
that the CJEU often treats this aspect of the right to work as essentially synonymous with article 
16, thereby ignoring the former.  
In contrast to the CJEU’s approach, under the common law dynamic interpretation, the courts 
have held that:  
There is simply no reason why parties should not, if they choose, agree that matters 
such as remuneration be fixed by processes in which they do not themselves 
participate.127  
In other words, both parties, exercising their freedom of contract agreed that remuneration 
would be set externally. In denying the rights of the employees who in good faith agreed to be 
so bound, the CJEU in its article 16 jurisprudence was interfering with their freedom of contract 
and thereby their right to work viewed as an expression of autonomy or freedom. In this respect, 
the English dynamic approach is more respectful of party autonomy as a whole than that 
adopted by the CJEU. This also negates AG Bobek’s assertion in Lidl that article 16 was 
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potentially subject to greater limitation than article 15 given that the former right is conditional 
upon national laws and practices.  
On the CJEU’s current reading of article 15 as being essentially synonymous with article 16, it 
is not clear what benefit there is in invoking the right to work to counteract contractual 
autonomy. This reading would also undermine the possibility of relying on article 15 as an 
Ungerian counter principle to freedom of contract. But, a more holistic reading of article 15 is 
possible. As already mentioned above, the Explanations point to the ESC as a source of the 
right to work. In that instrument, the right to work is a ‘core’ right and can be found in article 
1. The Committee on Social Rights has adopted a common interpretative approach to defining 
the content of this provision, which can also be seen in the interpretation of the International 
Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights. 
The defining feature of this approach is that, although both instruments couch the right to work 
in terms of accessibility and availability, this must be read alongside the other labour rights in 
those instruments, which form part of the general interpretative backdrop to the right to work. 
This leads to the notion of acceptability of work – ie, decent work.128 In the context of the 
Charter, such an approach could involve reliance on article 15 in conjunction with another 
Charter provision. Article 31(2) has already been mentioned, but other Charter provisions such 
as article 30 on the right not to be unfairly dismissed and indeed article 28 on the right to 
bargain collectively, might equally have a bearing on the outcome of cases involving article 
16. As such, we can move from the indeterminate notion of the right to access work to the 
much more concrete principle that employment should be just and beneficial to the worker.129 
A similar approach could be adopted to restrict freedom of contract in other regulatory fields.  
An additional flaw is that the CJEU’s current reading of article 15 completely overlooks the 
links between that provision and one of the four freedoms of EU law, namely the free 
movement of workers, which is also set out in the second paragraph of article 15. Thus, the 
economic freedoms, which have been found to be part of article 16, can be matched with the 
equally compelling economic freedom of the worker to access work across the Union. This 
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bolsters article 15’s claim to constitutional status and could help to counteract contractual 
autonomy in cases such as AGET Iraklis.  
There are, of course, dangers involved in meeting article 16 on its own terms, accepting that 
autonomy is an overriding principle to be valued in the employment context, with the only 
question being whether it is the autonomy of the employer or the worker that prevails on the 
day. As Deakin notes, ‘the right to practice an occupation that has been freely chosen is [only] 
one step up from [the] liberal conception of a right to market access’.130 It is altogether possible, 
therefore, to view the right to work as no more than an extension of the liberal theory of 
freedom of contract, which reinforces the current balance of the fundamental contradiction 
rather than reversing it.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
The concept of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right is likely to continue to play a 
prominent role in future legal and political debate as to the EU’s regulatory reach in both the 
employment context and beyond. In this contribution, we established that there is a complex 
and as yet underexplored relationship between the general principles of freedom of contract 
and the freedom to pursue a business and the same concepts found in article 16 of the Charter.  
The full extent of the relationship is yet to be played out, but what the case law does show is 
that the idea that the Charter radically departs from existing approaches to contractual 
autonomy is not so clear-cut. Although the intention of the Charter’s drafters was that it would 
codify the existing general principles, drawing on the notion of contradiction in CLS allowed 
for a consideration of the wider conflicting values that underpin freedom of contract in EU law. 
In other words, there is indeed a contradiction, but it is not the contradiction identified in 
existing commentary.  
The added value of CLS is in the clear recognition that any area of the law is likely to involve 
conflict between contradictory values and it is will not always be possible or desirable to seek 
an artificial thread unifying or reconciling those values. As such, the quest for coherence 
between freedom of contract as a general principle and freedom of contract as a fundamental 
right fails to consider the underlying contradictions in the (any) legal system.  Admittedly, the 
above did attempt to rationalise the two strands of case law doctrinally albeit in a way that 
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recognises that it is the individual end of the fundamental contradiction that is now being more 
explicitly emphasised, with the Charter as a constitutional document further embedding the tilt 
in favour of the liberal theory of contract law 
There are obviously broader constitutional questions that arise from the relationship between 
the general principles and the Charter, but from a narrower regulatory perspective, this article 
showed that the confused nature of contractual autonomy as a fundamental right is likely to 
have wide reaching consequences for the EU’s ability to regulate the employment relationship. 
This is because, although the precise reach of the concept has always been and remains 
uncertain, contractual autonomy has already been used to displace social rights considerations, 
allowing them to be viewed as ‘restrictions’ on the more important business freedoms.  
Evidently, there are lessons to be drawn for other fields in which social or non-economic 
considerations are to be balanced against business rights. Article 16 is therefore likely to be 
raised more frequently in other regulatory or governance contexts such as consumer law, the 
monetary union and the Social Pillar. This view is further strengthened by the nascent 
symbiosis emerging between the Charter and the economic freedoms, which can be described, 
without exaggeration, as the very foundational core of EU law. Cases such as Viking and Laval 
have already shown that social considerations faced an uphill struggle to compete with the 
Union’s internal market logic. The market freedoms read in combination with contractual 
autonomy as a fundamental right are likely to render the balancing of such competing interests 
altogether more difficult.  
The inconsistencies identified in this article show the dangers of relying on contractual 
autonomy as a regulatory concept. There are so many varied understandings of the principle 
that it becomes an empty vessel, with multiple meanings. Two solutions to resolving these 
inconsistencies (at least in the employment context) were advocated in this article. The first 
was to return to the approach adopted by the CJEU in its earlier case law on the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity. It was suggested that current arguments as to the relationship 
between the Charter and the general principles are constitutionally flawed and that there is no 
legal barrier to the CJEU relying on the general principles in conjunction with the Charter. The 
second solution was to match freedom of contract as a fundamental right with the freedom to 
pursue a trade or occupation, in other words, the right to work. The common interpretative 
approach to the right to work that has been adopted in relation to other social rights instruments 
should be applied to the Charter, with the right to work being read against the rich backcloth 
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of both the Charter’s social rights and existing EU employment legislation. Such an approach 
is consistent with the Explanations to the Charter itself, which point to those other rights 
instruments as inspiration for the Charter rights.  Read in this way, the right to work also has 
the potential to redress (although not remove according to CLS) the fundamental contradiction 
within the liberal theory of freedom of contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
